Breaking the Libya Game: A Beginner's Rulebook
As Libya’s ruling families play a chaotic game of fortune, Libya’s seemingly unpredictable system continues to work as designed
The Libyan political system can best be described as a complicated game between the Prime Minister of Tripoli, Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh, and the Warlord of Benghazi, Khalifa Haftar. Both men control rival governments in the east and west respectively, set with their own rival institutions and militia armies.
Confusingly, these rivals also mutually recognize a handful of institutions that nominally bridge the political divide between their respective fiefdoms. It is these corrupt politicians, armies for hire, and potpourri of competing government institutions that make up the pieces of the Libya Game. Dbeibeh and Haftar can be said to be grand-masters, manipulating these “pieces” against one another, while seeking opportunities to change the board, and rewrite the rules in their favor. This is how the system is built, and the chaos that comes from this game is not some failure of the Libyan political system, but the evidence of its success.
It's this game that Dbeibeh and Haftar have played for years in a mutually beneficial stalemate, but this status quo has proved to be unsustainable. For the last two years, Haftar has gradually gained the upper hand, silently picking Dbiebeh’s pieces off the board and forcing the Prime Minister into a corner. Under pressure from all sides, Dbeibeh has motioned to flip the table, in another effort to rewrite the rules governing the game.
The Libyan capital of Tripoli, and the location where Dbeibeh and most of the important game pieces reside, is currently in a state of uncertainty. Aggressive actions by Dbeibeh have led to the shutdown of Libya’s Central Bank, which is sending the national economy into a tailspin. Additionally, infighting has rocked Libya’s upper legislature, one of the country’s last remaining national political institutions, causing the body to fracture into two. These tensions have spread to the city’s many competing militias, who now skulk around one another, waiting for the first spark of violence.
Outside of Tripoli, Haftar has shut down the vast majority of Libya’s oil production, strangling the country’s only real revenue source, and in the country’s southwestern desert, forces loyal to Dbeibeh and Haftar stand poised for renewed fighting.
Through all this political gamesmanship, average Libyans suffer in an unjust system. Civilians across the country are under constant threat from militias who torture and kill whomever questions their authority, public services collapse as state funds are pocketed by corrupt bureaucrats, and the next generation of Libyans have few well-paying career options aside from joining a militia or working in the black market.
The goal of this article is to not only understand the current crisis in Tripoli, but to place it in the greater context of Libyan politics over the last two years via dissecting the components that make up the “Libya Game”. First, this piece will define the players, pieces, referees, and the rules of the game, then follow by relitigating the last few years of Libya’s political conflict within the game’s framework. Only then can observers break down the current crisis at the Central Bank, and understand how this is not an extraordinary event, but ultimately another play in Libya’s long game. This article will ultimately be an oversimplification, and avoid a lot of nuance in order to help ease readers into a very complex situation.
The Players:
The Dbiebeh Family, headed by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbiebeh, gained prominence during Ghaddafi’s neoliberal reforms of the 2000s. As the country opened up to western investment, the Misrata-based family became wealthy real estate developers through direct support from former dictator Muammar Ghaddafi. Abdul Hamid rose through the ranks of his family business right before the 2011 revolution, and mostly stood out of the spotlight for the decade after. He would start his political career in 2021, winning a surprise victory for the Prime Minister position in a UN facilitated peace process. It was later discovered that Dbeiebh had likely won through bribes and vote rigging. Sitting in Tripoli, Dbeibeh gains his strength from controlling the capital and the international recognition and governing bodies that come with it.
The Haftar Family, headed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, gained its prominence through Khalifa’s military career and former friendship with Muammar Ghaddafi. Haftar helped Ghaddafi come to power in the late 1960s and eventually rose to the rank of colonel. They had a falling out after Haftar was captured during Libya’s 1987 war with Chad when Ghaddafi publicly denounced him for his failure. Haftar would then live in the US for decades, only returning to Libya after the 2011 revolution. Here he began to build his militia off of various revolutionary units and former Libyan army groups. After one of Libya’s contested elections in 2014, Haftar launched a national campaign to wrangle control of the country using his self-styled Libyan National Army, but only gained control of the oil-rich eastern half. Now based in Benghazi, Haftar maintains his strength through his militia and control over much of the country’s oil wells.
While both families appear to have different backgrounds and experiences, both were born from, and propagate, similar forms of greed and power. Both gained their starts as allies of late Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi, and both mostly sat on the sidelines during the 2011 Revolution against Ghaddafi, and as the country began to fall apart, both forcefully inserted themselves into the new Libyan political scene. Both of them have expanded and concentrated their influence in their eastern and western governments, with many of their family members becoming prominent politicians and powerbrokers in their respective bureaucracies.
It is also important to mention that Dbeibeh and Haftar were not the first people to become major players in the post-Ghaddafi era. There were many people who were in their positions before them as the Libyan game is a dangerous one where fortunes can rise and fall overnight.
The Pieces:
The National Oil Corporation (NOC) is located in Tripoli and oversees oil extraction at every oil well nationwide, regardless of whichever entity physically exerts control over it. They also control a variety of subsidiaries like the Brega Corporation that handles the selling of oil. Black crude is the economic lifeblood that keeps the entire country moving, creating the money which pays off the militias and keeps Libya’s game profitable. Throughout Libya's multi-year polycrisis, the NOC has managed to remain alive through multiple wars and civil unrest, albeit at the mercy of politicians and armed actors. The NOC’s current head, Farhat Bengdara, replaced the long dominant former chairman in 2022 after a series of political deals between Haftar and Dbeibeh, which will be discussed later in this article.
The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) is headquartered in Tripoli and is the machine that takes the revenue from the NOC, and distributes it to all the rival governments and institutions in the country. The bank was seen as Libya’s last “professional institution” as its current contested Governor, Siddiq el-Kabir, has run the bank with an iron fist for over a decade. His immense personal control allowed him to keep the bank solvent and trustworthy in the eyes of international creditors, at the cost of little governmental oversight and virtually no external accountability. His secret weapon had been his personal control over the SWIFT codes, the digital key needed for the bank to access global financial markets. Through shrewed political maneuvering, Kabir had kept the bank independent through the decade-long crisis by funding Libya’s various competing players throughout the years, but this would prove to be unsustainable.
The High Council of State (HCS) is based in Tripoli and is theoretically the “upper legislature” of the Libyan government, but practically operates as a vehicle to unify the country’s competing administrations. It was born from the very first Libyan government elected in 2012, the Libyan National Congress, but was transformed into the HCS after UN negotiations in 2016. As Libya continued to fracture and split, the HCS retained a unique position where it remained recognized by all competing governments. While the HCS has little actual power, its unique political legitimacy is what really gives it authority, and whoever possesses it controls the direction and intensity of national unification efforts. The organization’s leadership is currently contested between former head Khalid al-Mishri and current leader Muhammed Takala, with the former often viewed as anti-Dbeibeh.
The Presidential Council (PC) is located in Tripoli and acts as the Official Head of State for Libya. It was another position created from the UN negotiations in 2016 and it is made up of three members, each representing one of Libya’s regions, with one acting as the senior representative and official head of state. This position was re-invigorated in 2021 during renewed UN negotiations, which saw former Libyan ambassador Muhammed Menfi ascend to the position on a shared ticket alongside Dbeibeh becoming Prime Minister. In reality, while the PC is technically above the Prime Minister, Menfi ultimately answers to Dbeibeh and has been a consistent ally.
The House of Representatives (HoR) are based in the cities of Benghazi and Tobruk and act as the civilian puppet government of Khalifa Haftar. Formed in 2014, the HoR was set to overtake the 2012 Libyan National Congress, but was prevented from sitting in Tripoli by hostile militias,and fled to the eastern city of Tobruk, thus creating the east-west divide. Weak and without a military, the HoR quickly became beholden to Haftar, who made the rump organization the civilian face of his military forces. It is currently led by its speaker, Aquila Saleh, a former Libyan jurist under Ghaddafi. It is the speaker of the HoR that actually has authority, something Saleh has stubbornly held onto for the last decade. It's the position of Prime Minister that is much weaker and mostly acts as a figurehead, with the position currently held by Haftar ally Osama Hammad. The parliament is not recognized by any country, but has received increasing interest abroad as a foil to Dbeibeh. More on why that is important later.
The Referees:
Ultimately overseeing the crisis in Libya is the United Nations, which has engaged in multiple processes to create a stable and unified government in Libya. They are a referee without a whistle, and attempts to call out any fouls committed by the rival governments fall on deaf ears. They are ultimately hindered by various other referees, who gladly make and enforce whatever rules they want for whatever side they prefer. The biggest culprits are the Russians, Turkish, and Italians, who have massively invested into both sides of the Libyan divide. They importantly assist the Dbeibehs and Haftars with avoiding international pressure in order to protect their own military and financial investments.
Additionally there are begrudging referees like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, who have mostly checked out of the Libyan game since their intervention to overthrow Ghaddafi in 2011. The post-Ghaddafi collapse was too complicated for them, and most of these nations have only raised concerns when oil production gets threatened. Most importantly, they are always willing to favor whichever player is necessary to get gas production back to normal.
The Rules:
For most of the post-Ghaddafi era there were no rules to the “Libya Game”, but an unspoken directive for actors to do anything and everything to gain full control of the country. Military force, overthrowing parliaments, and mass killings were unrestricted in the mad rush to secure the country’s lucrative oil industry. Many of the pieces and players listed previously were not on the scene yet, the central bank was divided, the NOC was fighting for survival, and the political landscape was even more shattered and broken than it is now.
The current rules to the game were created through conflicting efforts by the UN to build institutions, and by Haftar to tear them down. From 2016 to 2021, the UN cobbled together many of the institutions mentioned with little buy-in from actors on the ground. During this time, Haftar was still playing by the old rules of the game, launching multiple devastating wars across the country in pursuit of power. In 2019 Haftar attempted to take the remaining parts of the country he didn’t control, but it backfired, losing him large swaths of land. With Haftar bloodied but not defeated, and the UN efforts gaining steam, Libya’s current frankenstein political arrangement was born. A 2021 agreement was signed that saw Dbeibeh come to power in Tripoli, but like past UN initiatives the agreement was weak and quickly collapsed. This would see Libya’s east-west divide solidified in a bureaucratic nightmare, with Dbeibeh and Haftar retaining their own governments but also splitting control of a handful of institutions, Haftar controlling oil and Dbeibeh controlling the levers of power; rivals forced to cooperate in some ways and fight in others, unable to simply take everything from the other by force.
Thus the objective shifted from total control, to gaining as much money as possible. Dbeibeh and Haftar could not simply take the other’s king, so they built the game to maximize profit. With Haftar controlling most of the oil wells, and with Dbeibeh controlling the organizations able to sell oil, they agreed to a compromise. Haftar would gain an ally in Farhat Bengdara as the head of the NOC under Dbeibeh’s watch in Tripoli, in exchange for Haftar not hindering the production of oil. The vast money from oil sales would then be managed by CBL Governor al-Kabir, who acted somewhat as a neutral arbiter. Officially the CBL did not send money to Haftar’s government, but the bank likely made under the table payments and ignored fuel smuggling conducted by Haftar’s new allies in the NOC. These new rules seemed to work for everyone. Money began to flow, oil output began to rise, and everyone from the players to the pieces made a lot of money. The issue was the game was built on greed, and both Dbeibeh and Haftar never wanted to keep playing in stalemate. They both still wanted the upper hand, but it would be Haftar who would turn up the pressure first.
Grasping at Pawns
Since greed is the central tenant of the game, the stalemate was never going to last, and it became apparent as the state of the economy fluctuated . With his allies in the NOC, Haftar was able to continually increase his fuel smuggling options and pocket the money directly, greatly reducing the CBL’s funds. In Tripoli, Dbeibeh’s political and militia network demanded an ever increasing amount of funds and bribes. This began to put strain on the bank, and Kabir started to refuse Dbeibeh’s funding requests, which led to a very public war of words between the two men. Both began to accuse each other of corruption and siphoning funds, a crime both men were likely committing. Being physically located in Tripoli, and always prioritizing his political survival, Kabir was forced to lean toward Haftar and his allies for support. Now with a more desperate Kabir, and the NOC in his pocket, Haftar’s unrecognized government became awash in cash while Dbeibeh was losing access to funds.
As Dbeibeh was losing his economic pieces, the play for Libya’s few recognized political institutions became more important. Even at the beginning when Haftar and Dbeibeh were playing nicely by their new rules, the High Council of State was still conducting its mission to bring together the rival factions. For years the council was led by Khalid al-Mishri, who increased the HCS’s efforts to bring about some sort of negotiated solution. For years prior, these efforts had little effect, but through Moroccan deliberation, Mishri was able to hammer out a framework for new elections. Mishri was in no way a Haftar stooge however, and there were many instances where he publicly disagreed with Haftar’s civilian government over wording and implementation of the plan. There were also plenty of doubts about the ability for the HCS to even implement this deal, and ultimately the Morocco agreement was just a framework.
Despite this, Dbeibeh saw new elections as a threat to his own position, and began to physically intimidate Mishri as well as support his ousting. This immensely damaged relations between the two men, creating another weakness for Haftar to exploit. Mishri would later lose the next HCS leadership vote to Mohammed Takala, after holding the position for 5 years. Takala on his part was not a Dbeibeh loyalist, but he did drastically reduce the HCS’s negotiations with Haftar’s civilian government. This was the summer of 2023, and Dbeibeh was able to keep his piece from Haftar for the moment.
Appealing to the Refs
It wasn’t just internally that Haftar was making moves, as he made attempts to show that his government was more “responsible” in order to get more of the referees on his side. This was best seen through reconstruction and recovery efforts, two things that stable states are expected to do.
One of the less immediate casualties of the Libya game was maintaining public infrastructure, as local politicians and militias became more interested in accrewing power and money and less interested in the basics of governance. This meant that in cities like Zlinten and Derna, controlled by Dbeibeh and Haftar respectively, the failure of this infrastructure led to displacement and even death. In both cities, water infrastructure failed, causing groundwater flooding in Zlinten, and 100s of deaths in Derna after a dam failed.
The responses to both cities from their governments showed the glaring differences between both groups. Zlinten sat unhelped for months, as many of its residents lost access to clean drinking water and were displaced from their homes. No help came from Tripoli, as local authorities had no ability to deal with the crisis. While in Derna, Haftar was able to put on a show for an international audience. As the international community came to help, they were presented with choreographed images of militias handing out aid, and military vehicles being used to assist with recovery efforts. Haftar was also able to quietly use his increased presence to stamp down on any public discontent or anger over the disaster. Publicly, it was a way for Haftar to present his government as “timely and capable”, as a foil to his “corrupt and slow” rivals in Tripoli, despite the crisis in Derna occurring because his government was also corrupt and slow.
This presentation has allowed Haftar to increase international interest in his rival government. Countries like Turkey, which have been the traditional foreign supporter of Dbiebah, have begun to increase their financial ties in cities Haftar controls. With the legitimacy of his government being one of the central pillars to Dbeiebh’s power, foreign investment shifting from Dbiebeh to Haftar is a direct threat to his government's survival, something Dbiebeh is likely very aware of.
The Pieces Fall One After Another
At the start of August 2024, Dbeibeh was likely not only feeling the pressure from Haftar, but also reeling from his own failed initiatives. The summer before, Dbeibeh had attempted to expand his control in the few parts of western Libya out of his control, focusing on the Tunisian border of Ras Jdir and the western town of Zawiya. Ras Jdir was a vital trading route as well as an area for lucrative smuggling that was controlled by a nearby town. Dbeibeh fired all the existing staff and used his Ministry of the Interior to secure the checkpoint, but only for a couple months. In an embarrassing defeat, local militias from the nearby town scared away Dbeibeh’s forces without a fight, and after multiple defiant speeches, Dbeibeh was forced to negotiate with the locals. In the town of Zawiya, the city was plagued by a network of rival militias and families, and was a hotbed for clashes. Dbeibeh used his Turkish provided drone fleet to bomb his rivals, but these heavy handed tactics did little. Zawiya is still plagued by violent clashes and has become an open embarrassment for Dbeibeh. Unable to use force outside of the capital, Dbeibeh effectively remained trapped.
Tripoli was now an island, and not even Dbeibeh was secure in his isolation. The NOC and the CBL were seemingly working against him, and the August elections for the HCS were quickly approaching. Mishri was back fighting for his old job, and after being abused by Dbeibeh, he was now much more amicable to Haftar’s civilian government. Even worse for Dbeibeh, a Spanish investigation into one of Haftar’s sons was threatening to put the few oil wells he controlled in jeopardy.
Saddam Haftar, one of Khalifa Haftar’s more prominent failsons, went to go watch a soccer match in Italy where he was alerted to a possible Spanish arrest warrant against him. When he returned to Libya, he used his militia to shut down the country’s largest oil complex because it was partially operated by a Spanish company. With his petty revenge complete, Saddam Haftar was in a good position with his militia forces, being near the few oil wells controlled by Dbeibeh. Saddam announced his forces would continue to move west to conduct border security operations. Dbiebeh was now under fire from every direction. He had to change the rules of the game and fast.
Flipping the Table
With Saddam Haftar moving his forces southwest, and new elections for the HCS imminent, Dbeibeh decided to move aggressively. Western Libyan media loudly pushed the narrative that total war was imminent, and it allowed Dbeibeh to mobilize his forces to deter Saddam. Facing rapid pressure and likely not fully prepared to resume open conflict, Saddam turned his forces southward. Now with some protection against his adversary, Dbiebeh was able to focus on the HCS.
The HCS elections had finally arrived, and Mishri was the expected favorite. However, the voting was mired in immediate controversy after accusations of vote buying and bribery. Mishri was able to beat Takala by one vote, but there were questionable ballots collected that would have led to a tie. In a last minute effort Takala jumped on the confusion and nullified the vote, calling for the ballots to be independently verified and for a new vote in two weeks. Takala then forcefully closed the meeting as Mishri jumped to the stand to declare his victory to a quickly emptying room. Both Takala and Mishri walked away claiming they were the head of the HCS, breaking the long unified institution in two.
With turmoil in the HCS and Saddam blunted for a moment, Dbeibeh likely saw his chance to make a strike at the Central Bank and al-Kabir himself. Through his allies in the PC, Council head Muhammed Menfi issued a legally dubious order dismissing al-Kabir from his position. According to previous UN agreements, the PC did not have this power, and Kabir resisted. Militias loyal to Dbeibeh then targeted bank employees, kidnapping the head of the Bank’s IT division. Despite being surrounded, Kabir was able to prevent immediate violence from breaking out. He was able to secure his employees release, and met with most of Libya’s prominent militia leaders. Despite Kabir’s delaying tactics, Dbeibeh was not looking to back down. The PC forcefully created a new board and declared they would take charge of the bank. After a couple days, Kabir halted all banking operations, dismissed every bank employee, and fled the country, claiming that he was seeking to prevent harm against his employees and himself.
Dbeibeh’s forces then broke into the bank and installed the new “interim board”, despite their lack of any employees or access to the bank’s software systems. This brought all financial mechanisms to an immediate halt, throwing Tripoli into confusion. In the weeks following the lte august takeover, the new board has been able to get some systems online, including the global banking system, SWIFT. Due to their lack of legitimacy, American banks and other international financial institutions have refused to do business with the new bank, meaning they are unable to take loans to pay the country's massive public sector which makes up a massive percentage of the entire working population. In response to Kabir’s removal, Haftar ordered the shutdown of all the oil wells under his control, about 60-70% of total production, locking the new bank out of critical oil funds. Dbeibeh’s control of the bank has proven largely symbolic as its practical use is severely limited in its current state.
With the bank crisis beginning to blow up in his face, Dbeibeh has also been losing ground on the HCS. Takala was able to stall Mishri by throwing bureaucratic hurdles in his way, but Mishri is steadily clearing them, and Takala is running out of options. Mishri has been able to validate his election win and even rallied together a HCS meeting with quorum, while Takala is now forced to hold his diminishing HCS in the Tourism Ministry building. Takala at time of writing has not conceded defeat, but Mishri has effectively regained his position as the head of the HCS. With Mishri once again at the helm, he has begun to negotiate with Haftar’s civilian government to try and resolve the crisis of the Central Bank.
The New Rules
While it seems that Dbiebeh’s attempts to regain his footing have failed, he is still likely to gain something from all of this. The HCS is ultimately still based in Tripoli and MIshri will not fully be free from Dbeibeh’s heavy handedness. Importantly however, Dbeibeh has forced new discussions around the Central Bank. While his board is not succeeding, Kabir is still gone and Haftar is locked out. While the oil embargo will hurt Dbeibeh more, Haftar’s lack of legitimate lines of credit will hurt him as well. Both sides will be forced to negotiate, which is something Dbiebeh can use to try and get some concessions. Kabir might be able to get back into the bank, but his total control has been shattered, and if he ever regains his position he will likely be held accountable by a new board.
Dbiebeh’s recent high risk attempts to gain the upper hand have sunken Libya into deeper despair, but to him, that's just the cost to return to the 2022 status quo. Ultimately, both Dbeibeh and Haftar will face little to no consequences for the damage they have caused during this crisis. There is a lot of money to be made in Libya, and regional actors and backers of the Haftars and Dbeibehs will want the oil to resume flowing as fast as possible. This means they will reward anyone who might accomplish this, and will put up with the idiotic antics of Libya’s ruling families in order to keep making money.
What Does All of This Mean?
Presented above is The Libya Game: where the players want to maximize their power and influence, and will use whatever pieces they have available to them. This often means they will do anything like launch wars, overthrow bureaucrats, buy votes, and smuggle oil. The referees, hungry to make a quick buck, will enforce whatever rules changes are needed to accomplish this. It is all by design. A system perfect for the country’s elites to thrive, and for its citizens to starve.
For the sake of Libya’s people and its society, the international community must break the game. The prime motivator of the game is financial, and the capacity of actors to access funds must be curtailed. The international community should take strong action against Libya’s ruling families, focusing on the financial avenues that make the game profitable. Without money, none of these warlords and corrupt politicians will be able to run their extensive patronage networks and military machines, potentially pressuring them to come to a more permanent political solution. The longer the international community enables this charade, the longer this game will continue, and the more Libya’s people will suffer. Without some form of strong response, everyone will keep rolling the dice.